TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

I. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION 1

II. ARGUMENT 2

III. I. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ALLEGES

INJURIES AND DAMAGES ARISING FROM

THE SECULAR ACTS, PRACTICES, POLICIES

AND CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS AND

THE FIRST AMENDMENT OFFERS DEFENDANTS.

NO PROTECTION WHATSOEVER FROM LIABILITY

ARISING FROM SUCH SECULAR ACTS, PRACTICES,

POLICIES AND CONDUCT. 2

IV. A Claim Brought on the Basis That Scientology

is Purely a Sham is a Legitimate Claim Sustainable

Under the First Amendment. 3

V. B. Scientology is not Entitled to Recognition as a

Religion That is Entitled to Protection Under The

First Amendment. 5, 6

VI. C. Representing to Plaintiff That Dianetics and

Scientology are Scientifically Proven Methods of Curing

Homosexuality, Criminality and a Plethora of Other

Diseases, Afflictions and Vices, Whether or not Religiously

Motivated, Is Not Protected by the Free Exercise Clause of

the First Amendment. 11

VII. D. The First Amendment Does Not Recognize

the Unqualified Right to Practice Medicine as

Defendants Claimed and Implied They Did. 16

VIII. E. CSI and RTC Breach Their Good-Faith Duty to Bring

\to This Court's Attention Such Authority that is

Inconsistent With or Contrary to Their Arguments. 18

IX. II. PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY PLEADS

HIS CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

FACT-PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF THE

CALIFORNIA CODE OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE. 21

X. A. Defendants Deceive This Court With Their

Characterization and Misrepresentations of Prior

Proceedings in Federal Court. 22

XI. B. Plaintiff's Complaint Does Not Comprise a

"Pleading Monstrosity." 23

XII. C. CSI and RTC Bring Their Demurrers in Violation

of the Rules Specifying That a Demurrer May Consider

Only the Substance Contained Within The Four Corners

of the Complaint at Issue. 26

XIII. III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED

BY ANY STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 27

XIV. A. The Statutes of Limitation are Tolled by Defendants'

Ongoing and Current Acts in Furtherance of Their

Conspiracy to Injure Plaintiff. 27

XVI. B. Through Continuous Means of Intimidation,

Coercion and Duress Defendants Prevented

Plaintiff from Inquiring Into Defendants'

Tortious Activity and Thereby Concealed Their

Tortious Acts. 31

XVII. C. Brainwashing Tolls the Statutes of Limitation" 33

XVIII. Exploiting a Fiduciary Relationship Tolls

Limitations Periods. 34

IX. IV. RTC'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

ITS DEMURRER IS IRRELEVANT AND

IMMATERIAL TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY

THE FACTS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S

COMPLAINT. 35

IX. CONCLUSION 35

Cases

Aaroe v. First American Title Insurance Co., 222 Cal.App.3d 124, 128, 271 Cal.Rptr. 434 (1990)

(Cal.App. 1st Dist. 1990) 28

Allard v. Church of Scientology of California, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d 439, 129 Cal.Rptr. 797, (1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091, 97 S.Ct. 1101, 51 L.Ed.2d 537 (1977) 9

Ballard 3, 20, 21

Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882 (1944) 20

Ballard, supra at 90, 888 20

Bank of America, 19 Ca. App.2d 807, 810, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) 22

Barrington v. A.H. Robbins Co. 39 Cal.App.3d 146, 157, 216 Cal.Rptr. 405, 412 (1985) 23

Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.App.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 721 (1985) 27

Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (Fifth Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

119 S.Ct. 161, 14 L.Ed.2d 132 (1998) 16

Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 83 T.C. 381 (U.S.T.C. 1984) 6

Church of Scientology, 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 260 Cal.Rptr. 231 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1989) 18

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,

486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988) 8

Committee on Children's Television v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal.3d 197, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783 (1983) 25

Committee on Children's Television v. General Foods Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at 216,

197 Cal.Rptr. at 795. 25

Committee on Childrens Television, supra, at 213-14, 793. 26

Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604,

176 Cal.Rptr. 824, 830 (1981) 24

Doliner v. Pedone, 63 Cal.App. 2d 169, 172, 146 P.2d 237, 241 (1944) 24

Employment Division Department of Human resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110

S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989);

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) 12

Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, supra, 315 P.2d at 406. 5

Grassley v. Williams, 193 Cal.App.3d 639, 14 Cal.Rptr. 496, 498 (1961) 25

Green v. Palm, 15 Cal. 411, 417 (1860) 23

Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 9 Cal.App.3d 566, 572, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 484 (1973) 24

Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) 8

Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 46 Cal..App.3d 1092,

252 Cal.Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084, 109 S.Ct. 2110, 104 L.Ed.2d 670 (1989) 12

In re Rugiani's Estate, 108 Cal.App.2d 624, 630, 239 P.2d 500, 504 (1952) 35

Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881, 168 Cal.Rptr. 361,367 (1980);

Afuso v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co.,Inc., 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862,

217 Cal.Rptr. 490, 492 (1985) 27

Khoury v. Mali's of California, Inc., 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 708, 710 (1993) 25

Leeper 31, 32

Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.2d 195, 1 Cal.Rptr. 12 at 207-08, 21, 21. 31

Livett v. F.C. Financial Associates, 124 Cal.App.3d 413, 177 Cal.Rptr. 411

(Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1981) 28

Livett, supra 28

Molko 15, 16

Molko, 46 Cal.3d at 1123 35

Molko, 46 Cal.3d at 1124-25 33

Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.App. .3d 176, 190, 98

Cal.Rptr. 814, 846 (1971) 33

Owens v. Kings Supermarket, 198 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 243 Cal.Rptr. 627, 630 (1988) 24

Patrick v. LeFevre, supra, 745 F.2d at 159 (1984) 5

People v. Williams, 97 Cal.App.3d 382, 158 Cal.Rpt. 778 (1979) 29

Perkins v. Supreme Court (General Telephone Directory), 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6, 172

Cal.Rptr. 427, 429 (1981) 24

PH II, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.(Ibershof), 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682, 40 Cal.Rptr. 169, 171 (1995) 26

Reveillere case. Complaint at 53 30

Reveillere v. Pattinson, supra. Complaint at 51. 30

Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1102 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1032,

107 S.CT. 3276, 97 L.Ed. 779 (1987); Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1503-1504

(11th Cir. 1987), cert. Denied,

484 U.S. 1012, 108 S. Ct. 714,, 98 L.Ed.2d 664 (1988);

Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education, 757 F.2d 476, 481-482 (2d Cir. 1985) 5

RTC's Memorandum at 2-5 16

Saliter, 81 Cal.App.3d at 296 34

Schlesser v. Keck, 125 Cal.App.2d 827, 834, 271 P.2d 588, 592 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1954) 28

Sears 33

Sears, supra 32

Stearns Ranchos Co., supra, at 36, 326 26

Stearns Ranchos v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 40,

96 Cal.Rptr. 317, 329 (1981) 23

Tresemer v. Burke, 86 Cal.App.3d 656 (1978); Saliter v. Pierce Bros Mortuaries, 81

Cal.App.3d 292 (1978); Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,

274 Cal.App.2d 564, 569-570 (1969).

Molko, supra 33

United States v Kuch, supra, 288 F.Supp. 439, 443 (D. D.C. 1968) 5

United States v. Article or Device, 333 F.Supp. 357, 359 (D.D.C. 1971) 6

United States v. Zolin , 809 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) 10

Van Schaick 11

Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-62, 55

Cal.Rptr.2d 465, 475 (1996);

Grieves v. Sup. Ct. (Fox), 157 Cal.App.3d 159,164-65, 203 Cal.Rptr. 556, 558 (1984) 26

Warrington 33, 34

Warrington, 274 Cal.App.2d at 570 34

Wollersheim 34

Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 880, 66

Cal.Rptr.2d 1 (1989), cert. granted, vacated and remanded on other grounds,

499 U.S. 914, 111 S.Ct. 1298, 113 L.Ed.2d 234 (1991). 6

Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 887, 260 Cal.Rptr. 331 (1989) 5

Wollersheim, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d 872 at 888 10

Wyatt v. Union Motgage Co., 24 Cal.3d 773, 786, 157 Cal.Rptr. 392 (1979) 27

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 4

GRAHAM E. BERRY (SBN 128503)

LAW OFFICES OF GRAHAM E. BERRY

One Wilshire Boulevard

Twenty-First Floor

Los Angeles, California 90017-3383

Telephone: (213) 833-5900

Facsimile: (213) 833-5909

Attorney for Plaintiff

MICHAEL P. PATTINSON





SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES





MICHAEL PHILLIP PATTINSON, Plaintiff, vs. CAPTAIN DAVID MISCAVIGE, an individual; MARY SUE HUBBARD, an individual; THE SEA ORGANIZATION, a California unincorporated association; CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a California Corporation; RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, a California Corporation; CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY, a California Corporation; BUILDING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. BC 207364 PLAINTIFF'S COMBINED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEMURRERS OF CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER. Dept.: 45 DATE: July 27, 1999 TIME: 9:00 a.m. ACTION FILED: March 19, 1999 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Trial Date: None Discovery Date: None Motion Cutoff: None

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

Using smoke and mirrors, misrepresentations and irrelevancies, CSI and RTC conjure a straw man, only to proceed to show him to be an ephemera on a stage completely foreign to the one upon which Plaintiff grounds his Complaint. Indeed, in 2 of his Complaint, Plaintiff, Michael P. Pattinson (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), makes explicitly and unequivocally clear that his claims are not directed at any of the Defendants' religious beliefs or freedoms. To the contrary, the Complaint and the claims contained therein are directed only at Defendants' demonstrably secular policies, processes, practices, and conduct; none of which are protected under the First Amendment, and all of which are subject to the police powers of the states for the protection of their citizens and residents.

In their memoranda in support of their demurrers, CSI and RTC both attempt to divert this Court's attention from the genuine legal issues underlying Plaintiff's claims: (1) by improperly attempting to prejudice this Court against Plaintiff by raising a procedural history in federal court that is neither final, nor material or relevant to these proceedings; (2) by relying on federal precedent that is wholly inapplicable and non-binding upon this Court; (3) by failing to cite this Court to clearly controlling authority; (4) by obfuscating the genuine issues in this case by conjuring that straw man, embodying that which Defendants only wish this case were about, in an attempt to create an appearance of First Amendment protection thereby defeating it; (5) by attempting to claim that many of the Defendants did not even exist when Plaintiff first became involved with other Defendants, overlooking Plaintiff's allegations of his involvement with those Defendants once they were indeed in existence; and (6) by raising specious statutes

Of limitation defenses that do not apply and cannot stand to bar Plaintiff's claims brought in this Court.

Clearly, CSI and RTC are determined to do anything to avoid confronting Plaintiff's claims, the facts he alleges (taken by this Court to be true as a matter of law), and the truly applicable and binding authority relating to the claims alleged in the Complaint herein. Moreover, CSI and RTC bring their demurrers in violation of the rules of civil procedure applicable to them. For all of these reasons, this Court should reject the Defendants' demurrers.

ARGUMENT

I. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ALLEGES INJURIES AND DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE SECULAR ACTS, PRACTICES, POLICIES AND CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

OFFERS DEFENDANTS. NO PROTECTION WHATSOEVER FROM LIABILITY ARISING FROM SUCH SECULAR ACTS, PRACTICES, POLICIES AND CONDUCT.

Defendants place much emphasis on their contention that Scientology is a religion, asking this Court to take judicial notice of the opinions of the courts and determinations of the California and United States Governments that this is so. Regardless, those judicial opinions and administrative determinations place not one scintilla of weight bearing upon the genuine issues pleaded in Plaintiff's causes of action against Defendants. If Scientology is a religion, so what? It has long been established that religious establishments, their principals and their members may be held liable for torts and other violations of generally applicable laws, both civil and criminal. Never, in any jurisdiction in these United States, have the defenses, "Xenu made me do it," and/or "God made me do it," been recognized as legitimate in civil or criminal actions prosecuting wrongs committed by religious institutions; members of them; or for the sake of their spiritual doctrines and beliefs.

Plaintiff does not waste this Court's time quibbling with the validity of Defendant's religious or spiritual beliefs. He does not place at issue, nor ask this Court to determine, as Defendants suggest by analogy, whether water can be turned to wine, or loaves of bread multiplied to feed thousands. CSI' Memorandum at 12. Plaintiff does, however, allege that Scientology is no more than a sham designed to defraud him of his autonomy and his money; that the Defendants concealed their fraud; that Defendants exerted undue influence to control him; that Defendants brainwashed him without his knowledge or consent. Complaint at 26, 41(a), 41(k). In this regard, well-settled precedent establishes the validity of such claims.

A. A Claim Brought on the Basis That Scientology is Purely

a Sham is a Legitimate Claim Sustainable Under the

First Amendment.

Contrary to Defendants' assertions, the First Amendment does not immunize a self-proclaimed religion from governmental authority or cloak it in utter secrecy. When an organization's religious status is of legal significance, courts may make an objective inquiry into whether the organization's beliefs are entitled to First Amendment religious liberty protections. See, Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209-13, 92 S.Ct. 1526,32 L.Ed. 15 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut

(1940) 310 U.S. 296Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 604 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1148 (1940). While it is axiomatic that courts may not determine whether a given belief is or is not religion (U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944)), the trier of fact may determine whether a belief is truly held without violating the First Amendment. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965).

In United States v. Seeger (1965) 380 U.S. 163United States v. Seeger, (Id.), the Supreme Court defined religious beliefs meriting First Amendment protection as those "based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate and upon which all else is ultimately dependent." (Id. 380 U.S. at 176.) The Seeger court required that these beliefs be "sincere" (Id.) and stated that ""the threshold question of sincerity must be resolved in every case." Id. 380 U.S. at 185. Pursuant to this "sincerity" standard, courts have not been willing to accept bare assertions by litigants that their beliefs or conduct are "religious." See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. In Theriault v. Silber

(W.D. Texas 1975) 391 F.Supp. 578Theriault v. Silber, 391 F.Supp. 578, 580 (W.D. Texas 1975), the court indicated that criminal conduct by the members of a purported religion caused it to "employ sharp and careful scrutiny of his activities, including his claim of religious sincerity."

The Supreme Court has warned against anything but the most cautious review and exacting scrutiny when conferring entitlement of religious status because the "absolute protection afforded belief by the First Amendment suggests that a court should be cautious in expanding the scope of that protection since to do so might leave government powerless to vindicate compelling state interests." McDaniel v. Paty

(1978) 435 U.S. 618 55 L.Ed.2d 593McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627, n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 293 (1978). Founding Church of Scientology v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1969) 409 F.2d 1146Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1962), noted that, ". . . [l]itigation of the question whether a given group or set of beliefs is religious is a delicate business, but our legal system sometimes requires it so that secular enterprises may not be unjustly enjoy the immunities granted to the sacred." (Id. 409 F.2d at 1160.) The court concluded that a purported religion would not be entitled to protection under the First Amendment upon a showing that ". . . the beliefs asserted to be religious are not held in good faith by those asserting them, and that forms of religious organizations were created for the sole purpose of cloaking a secular enterprise with the legal protection of a religion." (Id. at 1162.) Thus, a ". . . sincere religious belief is a prerequisite to any free exercise claim," such as Defendants assert as an affirmative defense herein, placing "sincerity of belief" at issue. CSI Memorandum at 10-16; Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1102 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1032, 107 S.CT. 3276, 97 L.Ed. 779 (1987); Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1503-1504(11th Cir. 1987), cert. Denied, 484 U.S. 1012, 108 S. Ct. 714,, 98 L.Ed.2d 664 (1988); Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education, 757 F.2d 476, 481-482 (2d Cir. 1985).

Simply because an organization calls itself a religion does not necessarily means that it is such. Indeed, whether or not the organization is a religion, when contested, is a trial question Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 887, 260 Cal.Rptr. 331 (1989) (whether or not Scientology is a religion "remains a very live and interesting question.") inasmuch as ". . . [i]n determining whether [claimant's] beliefs are to be accorded First Amendment protection, the fact finder must delve into the internal workings of [claimant's] mind and assess the credibility of his claims." Patrick v. LeFevre, supra, 745 F.2d at 159 (1984).

In Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957), one hears a foreshadowing of the concern about persons ". . . cynically using [religious status] as a shield to protect them when participating in antisocial conduct that otherwise stands condemned." United States v Kuch, supra, 288 F.Supp. 439, 443 (D. D.C. 1968). The court stated:

Thus the only inquiry in such a case is the objective one

of whether or not the belief occupies the same place in the

lives of its holders that the orthodox beliefs occupy in the

lives of believing majorities, and whether a given group that

claims the exemption conducts itself the way groups conceded

to be religious conduct themselves. . . . Of course, the belief

cannot violate the laws or morals of the community.

Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, supra, 315 P.2d at 406.

B. Scientology is not Entitled to Recognition as a Religion

That is Entitled to Protection Under The First Amendment.

Scientology, over the years, has seized the status of a religion by default, not by merit. Indeed, even though it was regrettably constrained by the consequences of such a default, a United States District Court went so far to say that Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard's "religious cult" was nothing but "quackery [which had] flourished throughout the United States and in various parts of the world" after "Hubbard, writing in a science fiction magazine in the 1940's, first advanced the extravagant false claims that various physical and mental illnesses could be cured by auditing." United States v. Article or Device, 333 F.Supp. 357, 359 (D.D.C. 1971). Now, nearly 30 years later, despite Scientology's shrill exaction to constitutional status as a bona fide religious institution, the issue currently "remains a very live and interesting question." Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 880, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 (1989), cert. granted, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 499 U.S. 914, 111 S.Ct. 1298, 113 L.Ed.2d 234 (1991). This recent judicial pronouncement illustrates that despite Scientology's efforts to achieve by litigation what it has been unable to earn by merit, nothing has changed in the last 28 years.

In a 145-page opinion in Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 83 T.C. 381 (U.S.T.C. 1984), culminating in the revocation of Scientology's tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code, Judge Sterrett held that Scientology (1) is "operated for a substantial commercial purpose;" (2) "[Scientology's] net earnings benefit L. Ron Hubbard [and] his family . . ..;" and (3) "[Scientology] has violated well-defined standards of public policy by conspiring to prevent the IRS from assessing and collecting taxes due from [Scientology]." Id. at 443. The court found that Scientology is essentially a profit-driven enterprise. He stated:

Practically everywhere we turn, we find evidence of [Scientology's] commercial purpose. Certainly, if language reflects reality, [Scientology] had a substantial commercial purpose since it described its activities in highly commercial terms, calling parishioners 'customers'; missions, 'franchises'; and churches, 'organizations' -- just to mention a few of the more glaring examples of [Scientology's] commercial vocabulary. [Scientology] was eager to make money. This was expressed in [a Scientology policy directive dated] March 9, 1972 It sets out the governing policy of [Scientology's] financial offices by exhorting these offices to 'MAKE MONEY . . . MAKE MONEY MAKE MONEY . . . MAKE OTHER PEOPLE PRODUCE SO AS TO MAKE MONEY.' . . . This is not an isolated policy letter coming back to haunt [Scientology]. The goal of making money permeated virtually all of [Scientology's] activities -- its services, its pricing policies, its dissemination practices and its management decisions.

Id. at 475-76.

Judge Sterrett further found that L. Ron Hubbard and his family had used their control over the Scientology organization for purposes of covert personal enrichment: In the instant case, there can be no question that L. Ron Hubbard and his family are clearly private shareholders [of the Scientology corporation] . . . [T]he obvious indicia of benefit to L. Ron Hubbard and his family include salaries, directors fees, management fees, complete support of the family, and royalties; while covert indicia of benefit include repayment of alleged debts and unspecified amount and unfettered control over millions of dollars purportedly belonging to

[the Scientology organization]. Id. Finally, Judge Sterrett's opinion is suffused with references to Scientology's systematic and methodical violations of criminal and civil law. The opinion initially notes that the trial memorandum filed by the Internal Revenue Service catalogued numerous Scientology policies and procedures which the IRS contended violated public policy. In part, such policies and procedures included:

[1] Conspiracy to impede and obstruct the Internal Revenue Service. . . [2] the infliction of psychic harm including the loss of moral judgment through brainwashing accomplished by auditing and other practices and procedures; [3] the use of blackmail and intimidation to implement [Scientology's] 'fair game' policy; [4] the involuntary dissolution of marriage and family ties through the enforcement of [Scientology's] 'disconnect' policy; [5] involuntary detention and false imprisonment; [6] the making of false statements to immigration authorities . . .; [7] the removal of large amounts of currency from the United States without disclosure; [8] the false registration of [Scientology's] fleet as private yachts used for pleasure when in fact they were used for paramilitary training and commercial activities; and [9] the drastic punishment of staff and members.

Id. 83 T.C. at 411-12.

In an effort to narrow the evidentiary issues before the court, Judge Sterrett primarily focused both the trial and his opinion on Scientology's conspiracy against, and burglary of documents from, the Internal Revenue Service. The Court detailed the conspiracy as follows: "The conspiracy spanned eight years, beginning in 1969 and continuing at least until July 7, 1977, when the FBI, pursuant to a warrant searched [Scientology's] premises for evidence of the conspiracy and related crimes. The scheme involved manufacturing and falsifying records to present to the IRS, burglarizing IRS offices and stealing Government documents and subverting government processes for unlawful purposes. For example, Freedom of Information Act requests were planned for the purpose of having the IRS amass records in one central place where they would be easier to steal.

In pursuit of the conspiracy, [Scientology] filed false returns, burglarized IRS offices, stole IRS documents and harassed, delayed, and obstructed IRS agents who tried to audit [Scientology's] records.] [Scientology] gave false information to, and concealed relevant facts from, the IRS about its corporate structure . . . in the end, Jane Kember, the Guardian Worldwide, acting just under L. Ron and Mary Sue Hubbard in [Scientology's] hierarchy, was convicted of burglarizing the offices of [the IRS'] Exempt Organizations Division on three occasions in 1976. The burglaries occurred while an extensive audit of [Scientology's] records was in progress. Furthermore, Mary Sue Hubbard, Duke Sneider and Henning Heldt were convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice. Their convictions in part rested on their efforts to conceal [Scientology's] connection to burglary of IRS offices and the theft of IRS documents relating to this case. Mary Sue Hubbard was [Scientology's] second highest ranking official. Duke Sneider was [Scientology's] president for part of 1975 and 1976. Henning Heldt was [Scientology's] vice-president." Id. 83 T.C. at 505-06.

The Tax Court's revocation of Scientology's tax-exempt status was specifically upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Church of Scientology v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). More recently, in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989), the Supreme Court affirmed that "fixed donations" as part of Scientology's claimed "doctrine of exchange" were not deductible as a charitable contribution to entities organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes. Thus, payments for auditing and training were not tax deductible. The moral fiber, or stunning absence thereof, of Scientology has been judicially documented for years. Scientology is a law unto itself, dispensing what it arbitrarily calls "justice" as it sees fit in a modern day inquisition.

In 1976, the California Court of Appeal upheld a civil verdict based upon Scientology's criminal framing of an individual in its implementation of the "Fair Game" policy. Allard v. Church of Scientology of California, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d 439, 129 Cal.Rptr. 797, (1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091, 97 S.Ct. 1101, 51 L.Ed.2d 537 (1977). In 1984, Judge Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr. of the California Superior Court filed an extensive Memorandum of Intended Decision. He stated: ". . . [T]he Scientology organization, is on one hand pathetic, and on the other, outrageous. . . . [Scientology] or its minions is fully capable of intimidation or other physical or psychological abuse if it suits their ends. The record is replete with evidence of such abuse.

In 1970 a police agency of the French Government conducted an investigation into Scientology and concluded, ". . . this sect, under the pretext of 'freeing humans' is nothing in reality but a vast enterprise to extract the maximum amount of money from its adepts by (use of) pseudo-scientific theories, by (use of) 'auditions' and 'state settings' (lit. to create a 'theatrical scene') pushed to extremes (a machine to detect lies, its own particular phraseology . . ), to estrange adepts from their families and to exercise a kind of blackmail against persons who do not wish to continue with this sect." From the evidence presented to this French court in 1984, at the very least, similar conclusions can be drawn. In addition to violating and abusing its own members' civil rights, the organization over the years with its "Fair Game" doctrine has harassed and abused those persons not in [Scientology] whom it perceives as enemies. The organization is clearly schizophrenic and paranoid, and this bizarre combination seems to be a reflection of its founder LRH. The evidence portrays a man who has been virtually a pathological liar when it comes to his history, background, and achievements. The writings and documents in evidence additionally reflect his egoism, greed, avarice, lust for power, and vindictiveness and aggressiveness against persons perceived by him to be disloyal or hostile." On July 29, 1991, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of Judge Breckenridge. Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong, 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 283 Cal.Rptr. 917 (1991).

Armstrong was also the subject of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), in which the Court addressed whether the attorney-client privilege between Scientology and some of its attorneys should be abrogated on the basis "that the legal service was sought or obtained in order to enable or aid the client to commit or plan to commit a crime or tort." Id. at 2630. In Zolin, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Zolin , 809 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987), that the Government had not made a sufficient showing that there had been "illegal advice . . . given by [Scientology] attorneys to [Scientology] officials" to invoke the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Upon reversing and remanding, the Supreme Court ordered the Ninth Circuit to review partial transcripts of the tape recording sought by the IRS in an criminal investigation of Scientology to determine whether the crime-fraud exception to the privilege applied. On remand, the Ninth Circuit held:

The partial transcripts demonstrate that the purpose of the [Mission Corporate Category Sort Out] project was to cover up past criminal wrongdoing. The MCCS project involved the discussion and planning for future frauds against the IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. [citation.]

The figures involved in MCCS admit on the tapes that they are attempting to confuse and defraud the U.S. Government. The purpose of the crime-fraud exception is to exclude such transactions from the protection of the attorney-client privilege.United States v. Zolin, 905 F.2d 1344, 1345 (9th Cir. 1987).In 1989, another California Court of Appeal characterized the conduct of Scientology as similar to "a full-scale modern day 'inquisition' " that is "not worthy of constitutional protection." Wollersheim, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d 872 at 888. The Court of Appeal stated:

To illustrate, centuries ago the inquisition was one of the core religious practices of the Christian religion in Europe. This religious practice involved torture and execution of heretics and miscreants. Yet should any church seek to resurrect the inquisition in this country under a claim of free religious expression, can anyone doubt the constitutional authority of an American government to halt the torture and executions? And can anyone seriously question the right of the victims of our hypothetical modern day inquisition to sue their tormentors for any injuries - physical or psychological - they sustained? We do not mean to suggest Scientology's retributive program . . . represented a full-scale modern day 'inquisition.' Nevertheless, there are some parallels in purpose and effect. 'Fair game' like the 'inquisition' targeted 'heretics' who threatened the dogma and institutional integrity of the mother church. One 'proven' to be a 'heretic,' an individual was to be neutralized. In medieval times neutralization often meant incarceration, torture and death. As described in the evidence at this trial the 'fair game' policy neutralized the 'heretic' by stripping this person of his or her economic, political and psychological power. Id.

Given the foregoing, it requires strained reasoning to accept Defendants' contention that the collection of dicta set forth in their memoranda amounts to a "settled matter" regarding Scientology's status as a religion entitled for First Amendment protection. Indeed, in 1982, the District Court for Massachusetts, after a review of the legal precedent discussing Scientology's status under the First Amendment, flatly refused to accord Scientology status as a religion. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, Inc., 535 F.Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982). Significantly, unlike its adversaries in the cases cited by Scientology, the Van Schaick plaintiff actively contested Scientology's status as a bona fide religion. The Van Schaick court concluded:

The determination in Founding Church, supra, that Scientology had made a prima facie case for religious status is obviously relevant to, but not conclusive for, our purposes. As Judge Wright pointed out, the government did not contest the issue. Moreover, the determination was made 12 years ago; at the least, Scientology should have to satisfy this court that the factors Judge Wright found to persuasive still exist . . . Scientology thus might be entitled to recognition as a religion, but that entitlement is not clear. Id. at 1143.

Therefore, the Defendants' motion should fail.

C. Representing to Plaintiff That Dianetics and Scientology

are Scientifically Proven Methods of Curing Homosexuality,

Criminality and a Plethora of Other Diseases, Afflictions

and Vices, Whether or not Religiously Motivated, Is Not

Protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment.

The critical point for this Court to grasp is that Plaintiff seeks redress for injuries and damages arising from purely secular tortious acts, practices, policies and conduct to which Defendants did conspire to subject, and did subject Plaintiff over 24 years. In fact, Defendants continue to conspire to subject Plaintiff to their tortious conduct. While religiously motivated beliefs enjoy unqualified First-Amendment protection, California's Supreme Court has made crystal clear that conduct, even when "religiously motivated," does not enjoy that same protection. Molko v. Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 46 Cal..App.3d 1092, 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084, 109 S.Ct. 2110, 104 L.Ed.2d 670 (1989). The Supreme Court of the United States' decree that religiously motivated conduct is subject to the same generally applicable laws as is all other conduct and does not enjoy unqualified First-Amendment protection, further reinforces the California precedent set in Molko. Employment Division Department of Human resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). Accordingly, both federal and state precedent are in perfect harmony regarding the very limited scope of the Free-Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. As such, it is constitutionally permissible, based on religious doctrine or faith, to believe in murder, but not to practice it.

In Molko, supra, as in this case, members of a religious organization solicited plaintiffs. Rather than disclosing their true identities and affiliation, the members, or "witnesses," misrepresented to one plaintiff that they were part of an "international community of socially conscious people." Their goal: to induce him to board a bus and travel to a farm where he was subjected to nearly two weeks of intensely rigorous exercise, prayer and discussion groups. A farm-community member finally admitted to him that Moon was their spiritual leader, and that they were all "Moonies", members of the Unification Church. Id. at 1104. A different pair of "witnesses" approached another victim for the same reasons. She asked them directly whether they belonged to a particular religious organization. Rather than tell her the truth, they misled her, telling her that all of their associates came from "different religious backgrounds." Id. at 1106. 128.

Among other claims, these plaintiffs sued for fraud, alleging that they were induced to associate with the Unification Church under false pretenses and blatant misrepresentations, and also suffered from brutal indoctrination and emotional distress as a result. The court noted that the "witnesses'" misrepresentations were not "entirely secular" -- finding that Unification Church members engaged in a practice called "Heavenly Deception" in accordance with the Church's religious precepts. The court, however, held that the plaintiffs challenged the Church's practice of deceiving third parties, not its spiritual belief that it was acceptable to lie in order to lure unsuspecting third parties into its highly controlled and rigorous program of indoctrination. By sanctioning its members' misrepresentations, and the concealment of their true religious affiliation, albeit based on "spiritual doctrine," the court held that the Church exposed itself to liability for fraud. Id. at 1119-20, 137. Fraud is at the core of Plaintiff's Complaint herein, and at the core of the findings in favor of plaintiffs in Molko, the court highlighted the distinction between practice and belief. It found that regardless of the Unification Church's spiritual beliefs, its practices of deception (cloaked under the "Heavenly Deception" doctrine) was conduct. As conduct, it remained "subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id. at 1117, 135 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 304.)

The Court in Molko also considered plaintiffs' allegations of brainwashing, and defendant's posturing (through its experts) that such allegations were preposterous and that brainwashing simply did not exist. Id. at 1109-10, 130-31. The Court held that whether defendants had brainwashed plaintiffs to present issues of fact necessarily determined at trial. Id. Beyond this, the Molko Court also held that the same allegations of misrepresentation also comprised allegations of extreme and outrageous behavior necessary to sustain claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1112.

Molko stands for a number of profound legal principles. It affirms the right of the individual (1) to be free of fraudulent and coercive schemes, the implementation of which would usurp his sovereign capacity for self-reliance, the ability to reason and the capacity to exercise an informed consent; and (2) the independent exercise of free choice. It stands for the proposition that (3) an individual's independent exercise of free choice can be captured and controlled by an outside agency without the person's knowledge or consent, and that (4) such usurpation can be accomplished by fraud and by undue influence absent any threat of force. It stands for the proposition that (5) the ascription of religious status to such an usurping organization shall not result in its immunization from accountability for the consequences of such intrusive and totalistic conduct. The rule of law derived from Molko provides that tortious conduct, whether motivated by, approved of, or even validated or sanctioned by religious or spiritual doctrine or beliefs, is not protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

In this case, Plaintiff squarely frames his allegations within the four corners of the Molko precedent by which this Court is bound. Allegations of Defendants' misrepresentations, false claims, baits and switches, and out and out lies, can be found throughout the Complaint. See, e.g., Complaint at 16, 27, 32, 42, 43, 44, 52, 57, 78, 82. Blatantly obvious, but ignored by Defendants, is the irrefutable fact that Defendants' misrepresentations as alleged by plaintiff in this case are far more extensive than those alleged in Molko. Not only did Defendants' agents and representatives initially deny they were part of a religious organization (Complaint at 23), they affirmatively represented that they were engaged in the practice of scientific methods capable of curing mental and physical diseases and afflictions. Complaint at 1935. Moreover, like the plaintiffs in Molko, Plaintiff here alleges that the Defendants engaged in practices aimed at intimidation, coercion, brainwashing, and further that Defendants did, in fact, brainwash him absent his knowledge and consent. Complaint at 16, 26, 27, 32, 42, 43, 44, 57, 70, 82. Beyond this, Defendants amassed a file packed with highly sensitive, private and confidential information, warranting to him that it would be held confidential and used only for his personal benefit. In fact, Defendants used this knowledge and information to extort additional sums of money and threaten Plaintiff with exposure if he did not comply with their dictates. Complaint at 46 - 51.

A cursory look at the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint reveals that over 24 years, Defendants engaged in a complex game of Three-Card Monty: One second they were not a church (Complaint at 23); the next, they were a church, but only for the sake of diffusing the suspicions of a south Florida community (Complaint at 76 ); the next minute they are not engaged in religious practices, but rather, proven scientific methods (Complaint at 82); the next, these scientific methods are part of sacred scriptural doctrine along with writings formerly and currently characterized as science fiction. CSI's Memorandum at 10, 15; see also Complaint at 82 ) There are numerous other allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint documenting Defendants' false claims that they engaged in the practice of science; that they offered scientifically proven cures for Plaintiff's afflictions; and made claims as to the nature and background of the organization's leaders, as well as their accomplishments and qualifications. Complaint at 19, 20, 30, 43, 44, 45, 52, 65, 69, 82. This conduct, and misrepresentations made relative to it, find no protection under the First Amendment. Molko, supra.

D. The First Amendment Does Not Recognize

the Unqualified Right to Practice Medicine as

Defendants Claimed and Implied They Did.

Throughout their memoranda, Defendants attempt to claim First Amendment protection and privilege for the unbridled practice of medical science (psychology or psychiatry) upon third parties such as Plaintiff. CSI's Memorandum at 10-16. RTC's Memorandum at 2-5. Here, Defendants present the Court with a syllogism: The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion; religions sometimes practice medicine; therefore the First Amendment extends to religious organizations the legal right to practice medicine, or at very least, claim that they are doing so. But the First Amendment's purview is hardly so broad as Defendants would have this Court believe.

While the First Amendment guarantees the rights of individuals to pursue faith-based cures, and to reject scientifically or medically proven ones, it does not extend to religious organizations or churches the right to claim or warrant the scientific validity of their practices. In fact, courts have long ago found several of Scientology's medical claims to have been fraudulent and unreasonable. See, generally, United States v. An Article or Device, 333 F.Supp. 357 (D.C. Col. 1971). Courts routinely distinguish and separate belief from the curative conduct manifest or arising from such belief. Id.

In Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (Fifth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 161, 14 L.Ed.2d 132 (1998), a Baptist Minister falsely represented to the two female plaintiffs that he was qualified as a marriage counselor. Eventually the minister manipulated the women into having sexual relations with him. Plaintiffs sued for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 334-5. The defendant argued that marriage counseling was protected under the Free-Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit flatly rejected this argument stating:

The constitutional guarantee of religious freedom cannot be construed to protect secular beliefs and behavior, even when they comprise part of an otherwise religious relationship between a minister and a member of his or her congregation. To hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious leader in a preferred position in our society . . .By instructing the jury to consider whether Baucum's counseling, rather than his alleged misconduct, was "essentially secular" in nature, the district court provided Baucum with more than adequate protection under the Free Exercise Clause Id. at 336 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff in this case alleges numerous times when Defendants falsely stated or implied that they were engaging him in a process comprised of clinical scientific methods and further, that if Plaintiff continued through the program, through all of its various levels, he would be cured of his homosexuality. Complaint at 19. Never did Defendants tell Plaintiff that his homosexuality was the result of some spiritual defect. Complaint at 19, 20. Rather they represented and warranted that they had cured others of the same "affliction" and that their

methods were scientific and scientifically proven. Complaint at 19, 20, 30, 52, 65, 69, 82.

In essence, Defendants held themselves out as therapists, sexual counselors and scientists, not in an effort to cure Plaintiff. They knew all along their methods would not and cannot cure anything. Rather, Defendants wanted to extort more and more money from him. Complaint at 19, 20, 46, 48, 51, 82, 87, 94, 101, 102, 103, 106. For these reasons, Defendants, cannot claim protection under any Clause of the First Amendment; Establishment, Free Exercise or otherwise. Their acts and practices (conduct) of falsely representing scientifically proven medical cures must be distinguished from their beliefs that such practices are reasonable, valid, spiritually based, effective methods. As such Plaintiff does not ask this Court to judge the validity of CSI's beliefs or doctrines, but rather, the conduct of misrepresenting material facts to induce Plaintiff to join and participate in its organization under false pretenses and claims of scientifically quantifiable effectiveness.

E. CSI and RTC Breach Their Good-Faith Duty to Bring

to This Court's Attention Such Authority that is

Inconsistent With or Contrary to Their Arguments.

Conspicuously absent from the memoranda of both CSI and RTC is any mention, reference or recognition of ample controlling precedent that militates in favor of this Court's rejection of their demurrers because of the clear and unambiguous holdings supporting allegations and claims such as those made in Plaintiff's Complaint. Both CSI and RTC completely ignore Molko, supra, as well as other well established cases that mandate the rejection of their demurrers. Most egregiously, Defendants fail to cite Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 260 Cal.Rptr. 231 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1989).

Wollersheim establishes, as a matter of law, that claims such as Plaintiff has made herein are not protected by the First amendment, and that facts such as those alleged by Plaintiff herein support sustainable claims. Noting the absence of voluntary consent, the court went on to enumerate the kinds of intimidation and duress Scientology exerted over him stating: To leave the church or cease auditing [Wollersheim] had to run the risk he would become the target of "fair game," face an enormous burden of "freeloader debt," and even confront physical restraint.

A religious practice which takes place in the context of this level of coercion has less religious value than one the recipient engages in voluntarily. Even more significantly, it poses a greater threat to society to have coerced religious practices inflicted on its citizens.

* * *

It is not only the acts of coercion themselves - the sabotage of [his] business and the episode of captivity on the ship - - which are actionable. These acts of coercion and the threat of like acts make the Church's other harmful conduct actionable. No longer is Wollersheim's continued participation . . . merely his voluntary participation in. /. . religious practices. . . Wollersheim was coerced into remaining a member . . . Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom do not shield such conduct from civil liability . . . Such conduct is too outrageous to be protected under the constitution and too unworthy to be privileged under the law of torts. Id. at 346-47.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges conduct by the Defendants, causation and injury, nearly identical to those elements alleged by Wollersheim. The case proceeded to trial and a jury found in his favor, awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages. That Defendants argue before this Court that Plaintiff's Complaint, containing strikingly similar allegations, should be dismissed by this Court only matches the outrageousness of the conduct alleged therein.

In Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court held that:

Not every enterprise cloaking itself as a religion can claim the constitutional protection conferred by that status. It might be possible to show that a self proclaimed religion was merely a commercial enterprise . . .Though litigation of the question where a given group or set of beliefs is or is not religious is a delicate business, our legal system sometimes requires it so that secular enterprises may not unjustly enjoy the immunities granted to the sacred. Id. at 1160.

Defendants distort this court's holding by taking out of context the quote from this case they rely upon. CSI's Memorandum at 11. The import of Founding Church does not support Defendants' demurrers. Likewise the court in Van Schaik v. Church of Scientology of California, 535 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1982), expressly held that:

It is well settled...that religious groups may be held liable in tort for secular acts. Causes of action based upon some proscribed conduct may, thus, withstand a motion to dismiss even if the alleged wrongdoer acts upon a religious belief or is organized for a religious purpose.

Id. at 1125.

In United States v. An Article or Device, 333 F.Supp. 357 (D.C. Col. 1971), the court highlighted numerous non-religious medical and scientific claims asserted by the Church of Scientology without any religious reference whatsoever. The court noted, "The bulk of the material was replete with false medical claims and scientific claims devoid of any religious overlay or reference." Id. at 361. Judicial notice may be taken of this court's findings in

relation to Plaintiff's allegations regarding the contents of the literature used to defraud him as set forth in the Complaint. Complaint at 19-24, 41-43. Similarly, in Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal.App.3d 952 (1977), the court instructed:

. . . There is a distinction between interference of a person's beliefs and a person's acts. Nevertheless where does belief end and action begin . . . Evidence was introduced of the actions of the proposed conservatees in changing their lifestyle. When the court is asked to determine that change was induced by faith or by coercive persuasion, is it not in turn investigating and questioning the validity of that faith? At the same time, the trier of fact is asked to adjudge the good faith and bonafideness of the beliefs of the conservatees preceptors. If it be assumed that certain leaders were using psychological methods to proselytize and hold the allegiance of recruits to their church or cult, call it what we will, can it be said their actions were not dictated by faith merely because others who engaged in such practices have recanted? The total picture disclosed must be tested by principles applicable to regulation of acts of religious organizations and their members. Id. at 987-88.

Plaintiff in this case equally merits the protections afforded the plaintiffs in Katz, and the allegations in the Complaint make that abundantly clear.

Curiously, the case upon which Defendants hang their First Amendment hat, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882 (1944), is wholly inapposite. None of the allegations contained in the Complaint this Court now considers might remotely be construed as challenging spiritual or religious doctrines or beliefs or the benefits accruing from them, as the allegations did in Ballard. The holdings in Ballard turned on "belief in a divinity and in a supernatural power." Id. at 81. The Court held that the issues presented were protected by the First Amendment as they were rooted in an individual's right to believe particular religious precepts. Hence, because sincerity of the beliefs only were placed at issue, the First Amendment guarantees prevented the court from adjudicating such issues. Ballard, supra at 90, 888. If anything, the Ballard opinion wholly undermines CSI's and RTC's posturing when it states, "Certainly none of respondents constitutional rights are violated if they are prosecuted for the fraudulent procurement of money by false representations as to their beliefs, religious or otherwise." Id.

Sharply distinct factual allegations in the case at bar eclipse those contained in Ballard. Ballard clearly recognizes that conduct such as Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint is not protected under the First Amendment. Plaintiff alleges misrepresentations including, but not limited to, claims that Scientology was a science; assertions of objectively proven results ranging from improving one's I.Q. to curing physical and psychological ailments. Complaint at 19, 20, 30, 52, 65, 69, 82. Thus in this case, this Court is asked to adjudicate claims of deception and misrepresentation that are objectively provable; "scientific processes," not "divine" claims of "faith" and "supernatural powers" as in Ballard. Indeed, Defendants characterize these "scientifically proven processes" as "trade secrets."

Again, Defendants blow smoke and angle mirrors in an effort to convince this Court that Plaintiff is alleging what Defendants merely wish his case were about, so that they can then appear to have effectively destroyed it. This ploy must fail. When this Court applies the precedent upon which Plaintiff relies to the facts alleged herein, the only reasonable conclusion this Court can possibly draw is that the Complaint adequately states sustainable causes of action that overcome Defendants' demurrers.

II. PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY PLEADS HIS CLAIMS

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACT-PLEADING

REQUIREMENTS OF THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Defendants engage yet another ploy to confuse this Court and divert its attention away from Plaintiff's validly pleaded Complaint. Initially, CSI dredges up the procedural history of a case similar to this one, previously filed in federal court. Plaintiff also cites Judge Snyder's comments in that case, affirmatively and falsely suggesting that those comments were directed at Plaintiff's Complaint now before this Court. Next, CSI would impose upon this Court the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their notice pleading requirements, wholly ignoring that California is a fact-pleading state. Additionally, CSI also attempts to bind this Court within federal precedent, citing no authority whatsoever that remotely suggests any reason; whether public policy, equity, or otherwise, that such federal precedent is, or should be, applicable here. Finally, both CSI and RTC violate the rules set forth in the California Code of Civil Procedure respecting demurrers, which restrict defendants to addressing matters or defects within the four corners of the complaint at issue. For all of these reasons, Defendants' demurrers must fail.

A. Defendants Deceive This Court With Their Characterization

and Misrepresentations of Prior Proceedings in Federal Court.

In its memorandum, CSI devotes four pages to wholly mis-characterizing proceedings in federal court relative to a case that is sharply distinct from the case at bar. Albeit similar in a few respects: same plaintiff, some of the same defendants, and some of the same allegations; the distinctions between the Complaint at bar and that referenced by CSI far outweigh the similarities. CSI devotes much time highlighting the Honorable Christina Snyder's comments with respect to "Plaintiff's complaint." Critically, CSI fails to inform this Court that those comments were directed at Plaintiff's original complaint filed in that action, and not the Complaint at bar. Moreover, the complaint Judge Snyder references contained 480 paragraphs in 312 pages, alleging 10 additional causes of action, against 57 additional non-Doe defendants. Even conceding, arguendo, that Judge Snyder's comments may have been apropos as to the complaint she addressed, that court never made any determinations, whatsoever, respecting the amended complaints Plaintiff subsequently filed there; or respecting the Complaint at bar. CSI's attempt to imply some final and binding decision that bears upon these proceedings lacks any foundation or substance. As such, CSI's arguments in this regard are wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any consideration this Court should give to the instant Complaint. See generally, Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Ca. App.2d 807, 810, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).

Furthermore, CSI's reference to the imposition of sanctions must have no weight or bearing on these proceedings. Initially, the federal court made no determination or judgment respecting Plaintiff's claims there. As such, the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel are not implicated here, despite CSI's implying that they should be. CSI's Memorandum at 3-4 Moreover, the court's determination that sanctionable conduct occurred there is not evidence of the same in this Court. Beyond this, whether Plaintiff's counsel's conduct in that case was properly sanction-able remains to be seen, as Judge Snyder's Order will be subject to appeal, and review may well determine Judge Snyder erred by applying state-court fact-pleading requirements in the notice-pleading federal forum. CSI and RTC seek only to inflame prejudice and engender confusion with this diversionary tactic; merely more smoke and mirrors.

B. Plaintiff's Complaint Does Not Comprise a "Pleading Monstrosity."

CSI and RTC rely on archaic dicta contained in the California Supreme Court's 1860 opinion in Green v. Palm, 15 Cal. 411, 417 (1860). Originally, California's code-pleading rules were quite restrictive because parties had to rely upon them solely to prepare for trial. CSI and RTC ignore the substantial evolution of the law applicable to pleadings, ex post Green. In 1985, The California Supreme Court explicitly stated, "Any rule that penalizes a plaintiff for the mere form in which the pleadings are cast is inherently unfair and deserves to be discarded. Barrington v. A.H. Robbins Co. 39 Cal.App.3d 146, 157, 216 Cal.Rptr. 405, 412 (1985) (emphasis added). Furthermore, California's Code of Civil Procedure specifies that California is a fact-pleading jurisdiction and that fact pleading is unique to code pleading. CCP Sec. 425.10. It requires considerably more precision and detail than is required in notice pleading jurisdictions.

The "facts" to be pleaded are those upon which liability depends, or facts constituting the cause of action. Such facts are characterized as ultimate facts, or those which raise issues upon which the right to recovery depends. While allegations of unnecessary details (evidentiary pleading) or argument (legal conclusions) may be objectionable, even if a complaint contains such allegations, it is not deemed by the law to be insufficient. Rather, such additional allegations as may be objectionable may simply be disregarded by the court as surplusage, or may be subject to a motion to strike. Stearns Ranchos v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 40, 96 Cal.Rptr. 317, 329 (1981).

Of paramount impact is the recognition that distinctions between "ultimate facts," "evidentiary matter" and "legal conclusions" is of diminishing importance. Courts have become increasingly liberal in their attitude. Perkins v. Supreme Court (General Telephone Directory), 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6, 172 Cal.Rptr. 427, 429 (1981) ("What is important is that the complaint as a whole contain sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon which the plaintiff is seeking relief . . .") It is not even necessary that a sustainable cause of action alleged in a complaint be one intended by a plaintiff. A plaintiff may be wholly mistaken as to the nature of the case, or the legal theory on which he can prevail. If the facts essential to sustaining any cause of action appear within the allegations contained in the Complaint, it must be sustained and a demurrer overruled. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 9 Cal.App.3d 566, 572, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 484 (1973).

Defendants attempt to make much of purported inconsistent statements contained within Plaintiff's Complaint and in prior pleadings as well. Defendants air a hollow argument. While a court may take judicial notice of inconsistent statements made in discovery or earlier complaints in the same lawsuit, it may also disregard conflicting factual allegations in the complaint. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604, 176 Cal.Rptr. 824, 830 (1981). In this case there are no inconsistent statements or admissions relative to any discovery. This court may disregard any of the purported conflicting allegations that Defendants point out in Plaintiff's Complaint.

Plaintiffs are also given the opportunity to plead around earlier admissions by including a satisfactory explanation in the pleadings as to why the prior admissions or allegations were incorrect. Owens v. Kings Supermarket, 198 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 243 Cal.Rptr. 627, 630 (1988). Moreover, pleading admissions in a different lawsuit may be rebutted at trial by showing mistake, lack of authority or other reasons. They are regarded merely as evidentiary in nature. Doliner v. Pedone, 63 Cal.App. 2d 169, 172, 146 P.2d 237, 241 (1944).

While Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Complaint is defective as a result of uncertainty, applicable authority instructs that demurrers for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, or determine what issues must be admitted or denied. Khoury v. Mali's of California, Inc., 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 708, 710 (1993). Moreover, defendants are required to refer to the page and line number where uncertain or inconsistent matters may be found. Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist., 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809, 185 Cal. Rptr. 758, 765 (1982). Neither CSI nor RTC comply with this mandatory requirement in their motion or memoranda.

Complaints that show some right to relief, even though not clearly stated, or which may contain allegations intermingled with irrelevant matter, or even demanding relief to which a plaintiff is not entitled, will be sustained over demurrer. Grassley v. Williams, 193 Cal.App.3d 639, 14 Cal.Rptr. 496, 498 (1961). Significantly, pleading certain conclusions with respect to intent, malice, fraud, oppression, coercion and conspiracy is permissible where the complaint also alleges sufficient facts to support these conclusions. Perkins, supra. Equally important are the particularity and specificity requirements relative to fraud claims. It is well settled that such actions are subject to much stricter pleading requirements. Committee on Children's Television v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal.3d 197, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783 (1983). Every element of the cause of action must be alleged in full to demonstrate the how, when, where, to whom, by whom, and by what means the false representations were tendered. Stansfield v. Starkey, 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73, 269 Cal.Rptr. 337, 345 (1990). Even here, exception is made and strictures relaxed when it appears, as it does in this case, that the facts lie more within the defendants' knowledge than the plaintiff's. Much less specificity is required where, as here, the defendants must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy. Committee on Children's Television v. General Foods Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at 216, 197 Cal.Rptr. at 795.

Plaintiff pleads his Complaint in compliance with California's code-fact pleading requirements. The Complaint contains all causes of action related to and arising from the

tortious conduct of the named Defendants committed over 24 years. The counts for fraud and constructive fraud are pleaded with particularity to the extent that Plaintiff is able. Obviously, given the morass of organization that is CSI and its affiliates, the particularity requirements should be somewhat relaxed in this case. Even the question of Plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations that Defendants characterize as unlikely or preposterous does not militate in favor of sustaining the demurrers. Problems of proof are of no concern to this Court in deciding to sustain the Complaint and overrule Defendants' demurrers. Committee on Childrens Television, supra, at 213-14, 793.

Furthermore, Defendants have brought general demurrers to Plaintiff's Complaint. The law makes clear that where there are several causes of action pleaded in a complaint, a demurrer to the entire complaint must be overruled if there is any one single cause of action properly pleaded. Stearns Ranchos Co., supra, at 36, 326. General demurrers, such as those brought by Defendants in the case at bar, challenge only the sufficiency of the causes of action pleaded, and must be overruled if any valid cause of action is pleaded, even if not properly denominated. Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-62, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 465, 475 (1996); Grieves v. Sup. Ct. (Fox), 157 Cal.App.3d 159,164-65, 203 Cal.Rptr. 556, 558 (1984). General demurrers such as those brought by Defendants in this case do not lie to only parts of a cause of action. If there are any allegations sufficient to entitle plaintiff to relief, other allegations cannot be challenged by general demurrer. PH II, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.(Ibershof), 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682, 40 Cal.Rptr. 169, 171 (1995). For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff does not present this Court with a "pleading monstrosity" as CSI and RTC erroneously contend. The Complaint, however, sufficiently states facts sufficient to warrant relief and to inform Defendants of the claims being made against them. Thus, CSI's and RTC's demurrers should be overruled.

C. CSI and RTC Bring Their Demurrers in Violation of the

Rules Specifying That a Demurrer May Consider Only the

Substance Contained Within The Four Corners of the

Complaint at Issue.

CSI and RTC are fully aware that their demurrers are restricted to matters contained within the four corners of the Complaint and materials of which the Court may take judicial notice. Regardless, both CSI and RTC foist upon this Court allegations, arguments and hearsay that fall well beyond the strictures of the Code of Civil Procedure's rules respecting demurrers. Courts are only to consider the substance of the allegations contained in the complaint at bar, and those matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Courts may not consider extrinsic evidence or other matter, such as hearsay, that may or may not affect the sufficiency of the complaint. Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.App.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 721 (1985). Defendants violate these fundamental and elementary premises of demurrers by attaching two declarations and appendices containing improperly submitted extrinsic evidence. Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881, 168 Cal.Rptr. 361,367 (1980); Afuso v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co.,Inc., 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862, 217 Cal.Rptr. 490, 492 (1985). These circumstances also militate in favor of overruling CSI's and RTC's demurrers.

III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY ANY

STATUTES OF LIMITATION.

It its memorandum, CSI attempts to defeat each and every count contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, in seratim; contending that they are all barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. CSI's Memorandum at 18-19. Defendants, however, completely ignore Plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy, duress and non-consensual brainwashing, pleaded in each and every count of his Complaint. Complaint at 33, 34, 41(k), 42. Likewise, Defendants also ignore Plaintiff's allegations of concealment, also alleged in each and every count of the Complaint at bar. Complaint at 40-43. As explained below, all of the applicable statutes of limitation have been tolled by acts committed by Defendants through to and including the present.

A. The Statutes of Limitation are Tolled by Defendants'

Ongoing and Current Acts in Furtherance of Their

Conspiracy to Injure Plaintiff.

For conspiracy to toll the statutes of limitation, all plaintiff must do is generally allege that defendants engaged in a conspiracy against him, and state the last overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy. Wyatt v. Union Motgage Co., 24 Cal.3d 773, 786, 157 Cal.Rptr. 392 (1979). Because of, ". . . the clandestine nature of the scheme or undertaking engaged in, its existence must often be inferentially and circumstantially derived from the character of the acts done, the relations of the parties and other facts and circumstances suggestive of concerted action." Schlesser v. Keck, 125 Cal.App.2d 827, 834, 271 P.2d 588, 592 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1954). Alleging a "last overt act" in furtherance, or "active concealment of material facts" are two separate and independent means by which applicable statutes of limitation are tolled. Aaroe v. First American Title Insurance Co., 222 Cal.App.3d 124, 128, 271 Cal.Rptr. 434 (1990) (Cal.App. 1st Dist. 1990).

A "last overt act" is one that is committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, but need not ultimately be necessary to defendants achieving the object of their conspiracy so long as it could aid in completing the tortious act(s) targeted by the conspirators. Whether, as a matter of hindsight, the act was absolutely necessary to have successfully completed the intended tortious object of the conspiracy is irrelevant to the determination and identification of a "last overt act." Rather, at the time the conspirator(s) committed the act, it must have been reasonably likely to prolong or continue the injury suffered by plaintiff. Livett v. F.C. Financial Associates, 124 Cal.App.3d 413, 177 Cal.Rptr. 411 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1981).

In Livett, supra, a contractor and participant in a real estate development plan, alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of his compensation to be derived from the development, and to terminate the equitable interest he had in the realty by virtue of the development agreement. Id. at 416-17. The fraudulent scheme was to be achieved by agreement between the mortgagor and a parent company of the mortgagee at the time of foreclosure, whereby the mortgagor would acquire the real estate on behalf of the parent company and agree to resell it to the parent company for only the amount of the mortgagor's investment in the project. Id. Plaintiff contended that the effect of this scheme was to render the foreclosure sale a sham as it did not result in actual change of ownership. Its sole purpose was to destroy plaintiff's interest in the realty. The conspiracy was then furthered by sales of the realty to a newly formed paper corporation, financed by a newly formed finance company deriving its funds from the parent company. Id. Defendants argued that plaintiff's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, framing the "last overt act" had been committed prior to the termination of plaintiff as consultant to the project; the purported object of their conspiracy. As the termination occurred more than three years prior to commencement of the action, defendants argued that the limitation period had run, thus the trial court properly granted summary judgment in their favor. Id. at 417, 413.

The court rejected this argument, relying on People v. Williams, 97 Cal.App.3d 382, 158 Cal.Rpt. 778 (1979), which held that where the conspiracy alleged is comprised not only of the intended result of the conspiracy, but also its purposeful concealment for a period of time thereafter, a question of fact as to the scope and nature of the principal object of the conspiracy is presented requiring the admission of evidence on the subject. Id. at 419, 414. The court stated:

The purpose of the conspiracy was to prevent those formerly interested in the realty from knowing that the purchasing group . . . continued as practical owners of the realty even after the foreclosure sale, so that the ultimate disposition of the realty for the benefit of this group was not to be questioned by those former owners. . . If the conspiracy be deemed not only a plan to remove [plaintiff] from the property, but also to package and dispose of the property in a manner so as to avoid alerting [plaintiff] to the substance of the transaction, the conspiracy becomes a conspiracy to conceal. Id. at 420-21.

Recognizing myriad factual issues to be determined, the court held that trial court erred in disposing of the case as a matter of law. Id. at 421.

In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges numerous "last overt acts" falling squarely within the statutes of limitation applicable to each individual count contained in the Complaint. As such, all of Defendants' tortious acts, recurring in nature, as in Livett, and ongoing, thus toll the statutes of limitation given the "last overt acts" plainly alleged throughout Plaintiff's Complaint.

Count 1 of the Complaint herein alleges fraudulent representations of scientifically proven claims to cure illness and disease. Paragraph 30 specifically alleges that in 1995, Defendants referred to the "success story" of John Travolta, who "allegedly" triumphed over his own homosexuality as evidence of the scientific validity of CSI's fraudulent claims. Complaint at 15. Paragraph 34 alleges that at the end of 1996, Plaintiff met with Captain Miscavige, who warned Plaintiff of life-threatening defects of the New OT VII, level restating the scientific nature of Scientology.

Count 2 of the Complaint alleges Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentation that Scientology condoned and accepted concurrent religious beliefs as consistent with Scientology. Paragraphs 37 through 39 specifically alleged forced religious deprogramming of Plaintiff's Christian beliefs, occurring late in 1996.

Count 3 alleges that Scientology materially misrepresented itself as a peaceful, law-abiding organization that did not allow its monies to fund tortious or criminal conduct. This misrepresentation continues to be made affirmatively and by way of omission. Complaint at 30, 34, 37-39, 45, 49, 51, and 80.

Count 4 alleges numerous fraudulent statements respecting Scientology's founder's qualifications, achievements and scientific credentials. These statements have continued through and including the present. Complaint at 43-44.

Count 5 specifically alleges that Mary Voegeding of the Sea Organization threatened to publicly reveal Plaintiff's confessions held in his "auditing" files to the Church publicly in late 1997. Complaint at 49. More importantly, the Complaint alleges further that Defendants are currently using these files to allege a case in the abusively prosecuted Reveillere v. Pattinson, supra. Complaint at 51.

Count 6, for the same reason, is sustained by an earlier nondisclosure of CSI's "Fair Game" policy, and is alleged presently to be engaged to injure Plaintiff vis a vis the filing of the Reveillere case. Complaint at 53.

The "last over acts" that toll the statutes of limitation relative to the first three causes of action have the same effect relative to the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth causes of action and were commensurate with the present release of the confidential information that Plaintiff entrusted to Defendants while in auditing sessions; Defendants' threat to release the content of those files in late 1997; and their introduction of those files in the context of day nine of Plaintiff's deposition taken in the case at bar on July 15, 1999 further tolled the statute. Complaint at 49, 51, 86.

The "last overt act(s)" tolling the statute of limitations relative to the Tenth cause of action, were the fraudulent statements made by Defendant, Miscavige, regarding the scientific validity of Defendants' secular conduct made to Plaintiff in late 1996. Complaint at 34, 126. The contract was not for "spiritual salvation," as Defendants recklessly misrepresent, but for a scientifically warranted cure for homosexuality. Id.

The "last overt act" tolling the statutes of limitation relative to the Twelfth Cause of Action, is the immediate and present refusal of Defendants to refund the money for courses Plaintiff took. The constant, timely, and horrendous tortious acts of Defendants demonstrate that Defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his mind, morals, and money. That this conduct has gone on for 24 years is, by no means, a mitigating factor, despite the Defendants' contentions.

B. Through Continuous Means of Intimidation, Coercion

and Duress Defendants Prevented Plaintiff from

Inquiring Into Defendants' Tortious Activity and Thereby

Concealed Their Tortious Acts.

Duress, or duress facilitated by fraud, tolls statutes of limitation until defendant no longer places plaintiff under duress, or ceases in its attempts to fraudulently deceive. Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.2d 195, 1 Cal.Rptr. 12 at 207-08, 21, 21. In Leeper, defendants placed a lis pidens upon some property owned by the plaintiff, thereby forcing sale of plaintiff's property for a third of the properties' fair market value, in order to pay an outstanding debt that defendants were aware plaintiff owed to a third party. Noting that the duress that defendants imposed upon plaintiff arose from an initial fraudulent deception (defendant's bad faith representation to the court that there was a debt which defendant owed to plaintiffs, which defendants did not); the court ruled that duress tolled the statutes of limitation for the period of time during which defendants placed plaintiff under the influence of the fraudulent belief. Said the court:

Duress, as already pointed out in another connection, is a species

of fraud. It also should be held that duress is fraud for purposes of

tolling the statute of limitations . . . The two types of wrongdoing,

duress and fraud, are often factually closely interconnected and indi

stinguishable. . . . [I]t must be held that subdivision 4 of section 338

is applicable where the gravamen of plaintiff's action is duress.

Leeper at 207-8, 21, 21 (citations omitted).

Clearly, when defendants like CSI and RTC make somewhat unreasonable misrepresentations that a reasonable person might find suspect, but, in addition, creates a strong disincentive for plaintiff to question defendant's misrepresentations, courts may find the existence of duress. Sears, supra. The facts set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint vividly demonstrate fraud and duress imposed by Defendants upon Plaintiff by degree far exceeding that imposed upon the Sears plaintiff. Plaintiff feared (1) abandoning a cure for his homosexuality, (2) his "ruin", (3) embarrassment, (4) harassment, (5) his death, and (6) injury to his person. Complaint at 19, 20, 22, 27, 29, 48, 49, 52. Such coercive fear, imposed upon Plaintiff and exploited by Defendants for over two decades, comprises only a portion of the duress specifically alleged in 18 of the Complaint. Defendants also impeded every attempt Plaintiff made at trying to establish his own autonomy by employing threats of physical harm ( 96, 115-19), false imprisonment ( 93, 96), sleep deprivation and fatigue, coupled with isolation from the world outside of Scientology. Complaint at 25. Constant exercise, and isolation from the outside world such as Defendants imposed upon Plaintiff in the case at bar has been held to present an issue of fact. Molko, supra. Because Defendants placed Plaintiff in such a state of duress, instilling such substantial disincentives to question their fraud and committed acts designed to physically and mentally control and intimidate him, as in Sears, this Court should flatly reject CSI's and RTC's statutes of limitation argument.

C. Brainwashing Tolls the Statutes of Limitation"

[A] cause of action does not accrue until [a] plaintiff knows, or should know, all material facts essential to show the elements of that cause of action." Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.App. .3d 176, 190, 98 Cal.Rptr. 814, 846 (1971). When personal injury is suffered, for example, as Plaintiff suffered in this case, without perceptible trauma and by silent and insidious impregnation as a consequence of the act or omission of another, who knows, or who is charged with the responsibility of knowing that such act or omission may result in personal injury, and the injured person is unaware of the cause of his injury, and as a reasonably prudent and intelligent person could not, without specialized knowledge, have been made aware of such cause, no action for a tort resulting from such cause begins to accrue until the injured person knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the cause of such injury. Tresemer v. Burke, 86 Cal.App.3d 656 (1978); Saliter v. Pierce Bros Mortuaries, 81 Cal.App.3d 292 (1978); Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal.App.2d 564, 569-570 (1969). Molko, supra, recognizes that causes of action for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and restitution would lie for conduct which caused a plaintiff to allow himself to be unwittingly exposed to coercive persuasion. The concept of brainwashing has received approval from the California Supreme Court as a variant of undue influence. Molko, 46 Cal.3d at 1124-25. The fundamental theory is that brainwashing:

[I]s fostered through the creation of a controlled environment that

heightens the susceptibility of a subject to suggestion and manipulation

through sensory deprivation, physiological depletion, cognitive

dissonance, peer pressure, and a clear assertion of authority and

dominion. The aftermath of indoctrination is a severe impairment of

autonomy and [of] the ability to think independently, which induces

a subject's unyielding compliance and the rupture of past connections,

affiliations, and associations. Id. 46 Cal.3d at 1109.

When a person is subjected to coercive persuasion ("brainwashing") without his knowledge or consent, the results can be, and in the instant case have been, disastrous. Many individuals who have been subjected to coercive persuasion without their knowledge or consent "develop serious and sometimes irreversible physical and psychiatric disorders, up to and including schizophrenia . . .." Id. 46 Cal.3d at 1118. By definition, coercive persuasion can be imposed without the knowledge or consent of the subject and can cause severe psychiatric injury. Necessarily, under the standard set forth in Warrington, torts related to the imposition of coercive persuasion without the knowledge or consent of the victim, are proper subjects for the application of the rule of delayed discovery in connection with avoiding a statutes of limitation bar. Since Plaintiff asserts that fraud was employed to cause him to unwittingly expose himself to coercive persuasion, ". . . the statute of limitations [would] not begin to run until the Plaintiff discovered or had notice of all facts which are essential to the cause of action," Saliter, 81 Cal.App.3d at 296, particularly that he had been subjected to coercive persuasion without their knowledge or consent. Molko, 46 Cal.App.3d at 1118.

D. Exploiting a Fiduciary Relationship Tolls

Limitations Periods.

There are further grounds for applying the rule of delayed discovery to the Plaintiff's emotional distress claim. When the unawareness of injury is induced by fraud, or some other valid excuse, and there is no perceptible trauma from which the injury or illness may reasonably be detected, the rule of discovery governs the time of accrual. Warrington, 274 Cal.App.2d at 570. Likewise, fiduciary relationship, continuing duty and accumulated injury can each excuse plaintiff's unawareness of what caused his injuries so as to justify application of the rule of discovery. The facts alleged in the case at bar fall squarely within the scope of Warrington and Molko.

A confidential relationship exists, ". . . whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another." In re Rugiani's Estate, 108 Cal.App.2d 624, 630, 239 P.2d 500, 504 (1952). Such relationships are found in religious recruitment situations such as that before this Court. Fraudulent inducement into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion is a breach of the duty established in a confidential relationship. Molko, 46 Cal.3d at 1123. For these reasons, not only does Plaintiff adequately plead fraud, emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, and every other cause of action contained in the Complaint, but his claims withstand the Defendants' statutes of limitation challenges on the basis of their having brainwashed Plaintiff; insidiously preventing him from discovering his rights any sooner than he did. Complaint at 26, 59, 60, 73.

IV. RTC'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS DEMURRER IS IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE FACTS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

RTC's memorandum adds nothing to this proceeding save a duplicative and repetitive mantra that Scientology is a religion. As discussed above, Plaintiff concedes that Scientology calls itself a religion, but that ample precedent militates for the scrutiny of the sincerity of those claims, as well as the prosecution of claims for injuries arising from tortious secular acts, practices, policies and conduct. Complaint at 2

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should overrule the Defendants' demurrers, sustain Plaintiff's Complaint, and enter an Order finding that Plaintiff's Complaint adequately states causes of action against all the named Defendants. In the alternative, Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his Complaint, curing any defects this Court might enunciate upon disposing of Defendants' motions.

Dated: July __, 1999

Respectfully Submitted:

Law Offices of Graham E. Berry

By:_______________________________

Graham E. Berry, Attorney for Plaintiff











PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

) ss.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is One Wilshire Boulevard, Twenty-First Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017.

On July 21, 1999 I served the foregoing document described as PLAINTIFF'S COMBINED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEMURRERS OF CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER. on interested parties in this action by placing true copies thereof, enclosed in sealed envelopes, addressed and distributed as follows:

[XX ] By Facsimile: I served the above described document(s) to the interested parties listed on the attached Service List herein. A copy of the transmission confirmation report(s) are attached hereto.

[XX ] By Mail: I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing of correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage fully paid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing affidavit.

[] By Messenger: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be served by messenger at the offices of the interested parties set forth below. See Proof of Service by Messenger attached hereto.

[ ] HAND DELIVERY I served the above-referenced document(s) to be served on the following interested parites directly by hand.

Kendrick L. Moxon, Esq., 3055 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 900 Los Angeles, California 90010 (213) 287-4468 (Office) (213) 487-5385 (Fax) Samuel D. Rosen, Esq. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &Walker, Thirty-first floor, 399 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022-4697 (212) 318-6000 (Office) (212) 319-4090 (Fax)

[] Federal. I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

[XX] State. I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the above is true and correct.

Executed this 21st day of July, 1999, at Los Angeles, California.



SCOTT A. MAYER _________________________

TYPE OR PRINT Scott A. Mayer

SERVICE LIST



CAPTAIN DAVID MISCAVIGE & RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER:

Samuel D. Rosen, Esq.

Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker,

Thirty-first floor,

399 Park Avenue,

New York, New York 10022-4697

(212) 318-6000 (Office) (212) 319-4090 (Fax)

Michael Terrill, Esq.,

Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker,

Thirty-third floor,

555 South Flower Street,

Los Angeles, CA 90071- 2371

(213) 683-6000 (Office) (213) 627-0705 (Fax)

MARY SUE HUBBARD:

Mary Sue Hubbard

6331 Hollywood Boulevard,

12th Floor,

Los Angeles, CA 90027

Eric M.Lieberman,Esq

Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky

& Lieberman,P.C.,

740 Broadway, Fifth Floor,

New York, New York 10003

(212) 890-6611 (212) 674-4614 (Fax)

THE SEA ORGANIZATION:

Elliot Abelson, Esq.,

3055 Wilshire Boulevard

Suite 700

Los Angeles, California 90010

(323) 960-1935 (213) 487-5385 (Fax)









CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL:

Kendrick L. Moxon, Esq.,

MOXON & KOBRIN,

3055 Wilshire Boulevard

Suite 900

Los Angeles, California 90010

(213) 487-4468 (213) 487-5385 (Fax)

Eric M.Lieberman,Esq

Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky

& Lieberman,P.C.,

740 Broadway, Fifth Floor,

New York, New York 10003

(212) 890-6611 (212) 674-4614 (Fax)

CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY:

Monique E. Yingling, Esq.

Zuckert ,Scoutt & Rasenberger,LLP

888 Seventeenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20006-5509

(202) 298-8660 (Office) (202) 342-0683 (Fax)

BUILDING MANAGEMENT SERVICES:

Richard Fond, Esq.

Simke Chodos

1880 Century Park East

Suite 151

Los Angeles, CA 90067 - 1615

(310) 203-3888 (Office) (310) 203-3886 (Fax)